agreement on the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
A model of the political economy of agricultural tions at the December 1990 Brussels meetings. Inpolicy formulation was used to analyze the current deed, the accusations against the Community are so stalemate in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral frequent and strident that they could be called "EC Trade Negotiations. The combination of social welbashing." Drazek and Paggi, lobbyists for the fare increasing and transferring policies in the EuroAmerican Farm Bureau, clearly placed the blame for pean Community and the U.S. is one of the primary the breakdown in negotiations on the EC. "Failure causes of the deadlock in trade negotiations. The was snatched from the jaws of success by the EuroCommunity's farm policy of high internal price suppean Community ....The intransigent position of ports, limited market access, and export subsidies those representing European agriculture signaled an represents short-term equilibria in the market for unsuccessful conclusion to the troubled talks. The social-welfare policies which distribute benefits to EC refused multiple requests from many countries producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayto engage in meaningful negotiations ..." (p. 34). ers. Thus, the opportunity for internal reform of the Drazek and Paggi's prescription for success in the CAP leading to a compromise in the GATT negotia-GATT talks hinges on (1) internal EC pressures from tions is problematic at best. However, international non-agricultural interests to "save the trade round," commitments to agricultural policy reform will force and (2) political commitments to EC farmers that the Community to make concessions which will their incomes will be protected in some acceptable bring equivalent change in domestic policy.
fashion. EC flexibility on agricultural support is termed "minimal at best." Key words: Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade
The U.S. took a strong adversarial position in the Negotiations, interantional trade, Uruguay Round from the very beginning. Its initial GATT free trade proposal was viewed by the EC as "ex-~~~~~~~~~A lhu gclu r pl treme and unacceptable." Thus, each side found the Although agricultural trade policy reform constiother's proposal unacceptable, ultimately leading to tutes only a small part of the Uruguay Round of the suspension of the trade negotiations on DecemMultilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) under the ber 7, 1990 . Even as the talks resumed, fundamental auspicies of the GATT, it has become a serious differences in the two positions remained. Unless stumbling block to concluding a trade agreement. differences between the U.S. and EC over agriculFarmers, producer associations, and politicians are tural internal support, export subsidies, market acreluctant to give up border protection on agricultural cess, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures can be commodities, reform internal support policies, or resolved, agriculture will remain a major stumbling eliminate export subsidies; hence the GATT negotiablock to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay tions are at a stalemate. Solutions to this impasse are Round of MTN. grounded in the complex systems of agricultural
The objectives of this paper were to: (1) briefly policies designed to support farm income in the U.S.
review the theoretical basis of the social-welfare and European Community (EC).
enhancing and transferring policies in the agriculThe European Community's Common Agricultural sector as they apply to the impasse in the tural Policy (CAP) is one of the most complex sysUruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations; tems of farm support among the developed countries.
(2) review the status of agricultural policy reform in The European Community has been blamed repeatthe U.S. and EC as it applies to the trade negotiaedly for the failure of the negotiators to reach an tions; (3) analyze selected components of the current U.S. -EC trade dispute in a political economy framespecific sector. The U.S. is a prime example with its work; and (4) suggest areas for potential compro-"free trade" agenda alternatively being supported mise in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and opposed by various agricultural, commercial, or for agriculture.
taxpayer lobbies with narrow special interest agendas.
JOINT POLICY APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM Models of the political economy of policy formu-AND ASSOCIATED COSTS lation may help explain the stalemate in the GATT Agricultural protectionism has its origin in governnegotiations. Current food and agricultural policies ment's response to agriculture's declining share of represent short-term equilibria in the political/ecothe national economy. During periods of economic nomic markets for social-welfare policies (Rausser growth, agriculture's share of economic activity deand Foster). In Rausser and Foster's model of politicines, since the income elasticity of demand for cal economy, governments seek to maximize their food is less than that for nonfood items (Anderson) . support from social groups through a combination of Moreover, agricultural productivity growth results in social-welfare increasing (PERTs) and welfarea downward pressure on commodity prices, farm transferring policies (PESTs).
income, and employment relative to the nonfarm Food and fiber "... policies are in place, in part, sector. To avoid agriculture's having a declining because they serve the interest of those with relative share of economic activity, government policy ". .. political power and influence" (Rausser and Foster requires either a strong bias in productivity growth p. 642). These policies are available to governments towards the farm sector ... and/or a heavy distortion to maximize their support through manipulation of of incentives towards agriculture" (Anderson p. consumer and producer welfare. For a mathematical 195). These incentives consist of a broad portfolio presentation of this manipulation process, the reader of PERTs and PESTs that became increasingly exshould refer directly to Rausser and Foster. pensive in the 1980s. In their analytical framework, PESTs are policies The U.S. and the EC have vigorously pursued price designed to redistribute wealth from one social policies designed to arrest the decline in agriculture's group to another while PERTs are policies that reshare of employment, exports, and income. Their duce transaction costs in the private sector by corpolicies have resulted in runaway budgetary costs, recting market failures or providing public goods; imbalances in world agricultural markets, and an e.g., environmental and conservation programs, new escalation of trade conflicts among major trading agricultural technology, research, and extension.
partners. The taxpayer costs of agricultural support PERTs are neutral with respect to their distributional in the U.S. and EC became the catalysts for GAIT effects. That is, large or small farmers have access proposals to reform internal support measures. Govto the same technology. The aggregate effect of ernments have responded with various reform prothese public goods on agriculture may be an increase posals to reduce taxpayer costs. Farm lobbyists have in both producers' and consumers' welfare. Howcountered with support or opposition to the MTN ever, the market effect of these PERTs may reduce depending upon perceived welfare gains or losses producers' welfare as new technology shifts the supfrom a change in agricultural protection. ply of farm products, resulting in a decline in producer prices and farm income assuming no change in demand.
AGRICULTURAL (February 1988) were influenced by the ongoing positions in its agricultural support programs, all of GATT negotiations, the budget deficit crisis in the which influence its position and proposals in the U.S., and the rising cost of the Common Agricultural Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Policy. The 1990 farm bill continues the market-oriThese include the annual price support package, ented approach and aggressive export assistance conflicting interpretations of the 1988 ceiling on contained in the previous farm bill (The Food Secufarm spending, the Agriculture Commission's CAP rity Act of 1985.) Changes in the domestic support reform initiative, and the EC's GATT position itself. policies in the U.S. and EC represent only short-term Each proposal impacts the set of PERTs and PESTs welfare adjustments while the potential outcome of that enhance and transfer welfare to the EC's 9.4 the GATT negotiations represent long-term shifts in million farmers (Herlihy and Weiss) . consumer, producer, and taxpayer welfare.
The EC's agricultural policies have objectives CAP Budget Costs similar to those in other industrialized economies.
In the mid 1980s, the cost of farm support triggered The Treaty of Rome, which set up the EC, explicitly the process of CAP reform. The February, 1988, mandated a common agricultural policy with speEuropean Council's supply management agreecific objectives to: (1) increase farm productivity, (2) ment-to limit CAP spending, establish production ensure a fair living standard for farmers, (3) stabilize quotas, limit price support increases, and penalize agricultural markets, and (4) guarantee stable food overproduction with co-responsibility levies-was supplies at reasonable prices to consumers (Euroonly a short-term measure and did not address the pean Communities Commission 1987, Article 39, fundamental cause of the budget crisis. pp. 155-156). The EC has developed its widelyEuropean Community spending on agricultural known system of internal price supports, border price and income support climbed steadily during protection, food stocks, and export subsidies to the 1980s, reaching a peak of 28.9 bn ECU ($34.1 achieve its objectives. "Together with rapid technobn) in 1988, as domestic production responded to logical progress in agriculture, . . . [the Common high support prices (USDA). Thus, intervention acAgricultural Policy] has stimulated EC food productivities (government commodity stock purchases) tion well beyond self-sufficiency in many commodiand export refunds accounted for more than 80 perties, creating expensive surpluses and distorting cent of CAP expenditures ( Figure 1 ). Surplus cominternational commodity markets" (Moyer and modities, mainly cereals ( Figure 2 ) were either Josling, p. 25). Thus, the EC entered the Uruguay disposed of on world markets or placed in storage.
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations faced with
The budget stabilizer agreement came into force in internal pressures to curtail the high cost of the CAP 1988 as the heads of government imposed a ceiling and conflicts with its trading partners over market on Community spending for agriculture. In 1991, access and subsidized competition in world markets.
however, another budget crisis developed because of The public choice paradigm explains the resistance the overproduction of cereals, beef, butter, and skim to reforms in the U.S. and the EC and predicts that milk powder; thus the EC Commission estimated individuals, in this case farm organizations, are that CAP costs would exceed the budget ceiling of likely to commit resources to influence the policy 32.511 bn ECU ($39 bn). process in direct proportion to the degree to which
The stabilizer agreement, approved by the Eurotheir interests are at stake (Moyer and Josling, p. pean Council, imposed a strict limit on the growth of 206). "Price support policies in both the EC and agricultural spending at 74 percent of GNP growth. USA create large rents and financial interests for Thus, agricultural support was tied directly to ecofarmers, which they have a strong interest in mobinomic performance in the Community (Moyer and lizing to protect" (Moyer and Josling). Certainly, Josling). If economic growth slowed down, agriculresources have been marshalled by farm organizatural expenditures would have to be adjusted accordtions in the EC and U.S. to protect the PESTs in their ingly. Predicting the annual cost of the CAP is respective systems. Price supports remain relatively difficult due to the random elements in agricultural high, border protection remains in place, and export supply and demand. The Commission's estimates of subsidies are widely used to dispose of surpluses.
CAP The Council of Ministers ultimately approved a (Agra Europe, March 1, 1991, p. P/3). Thus, the EC farm price support package in late May 1991 conCommission's proposal for radical reform in the taining cuts in the nominal support prices for beef, CAP placed additional limits on the supply side. It milk and cereals, an increase in the cereals co-realso shifted the CAP focus to social objectives such sponsibility levy (a tax on over-quota production) as maintaining the rural environment and shifting from 3 percent to 5 percent, a 2 percent reduction in production away from intensive farming to extensive milk quotas, a 1.5 percent cut in the guaranteed systems. Direct income aids would be used to proprices for oilseeds and protein crops, and a substantect the incomes of cereal and livestock producers tial reduction in the EC support for the tobacco (Agra Europe, January 25, 1991 choice theory that complex policies promote policy levy on excess cereal production over the maximum inertia and incrementalism is substantiated in Macguaranteed quantity will be abolished. Individual Sharry's proposals. The basic principles and instruproducers will be compensated for their loss of inments of the CAP for cereals were maintained in come through direct compensatory payments equal MacSharry's plan; however, he proposed cuts in to the difference between the current target price target prices by 35 percent over three years, with (155 ECU/mt or $221/mt) and the reduced target income support paid on a sliding scale so that small prices. These annual compensatory payments have farmers would be fully compensated for their loss of been fixed at 25, 35, and 45 ECUs/mt, for three income. A 15 percent acreage set-aside program was successive marketing years provided producers set also included as a supply control measure (Agra aside 15 percent of their arable land. Compensation Europe July 5, 1991). Environmental programs and for set-aside land will be based on average yields, early retirement payments were also included in his stipulated in separate regulations (See Council of the proposal. In summary MacSharry's CAP reform European Communities, May 1992; Agra Europe, proposals were designed to protect EC farm income May 22, 1992). through a complex system of decoupled payments Complex changes in livestock sector policies were and environmental support mechanisms.
included in the CAP reforms. Ceilings on beef intervention purchases were to be reduced 53 percent AGREEMENT ON THE REFORM OF THE through 1997 and price supports were to be cut 15 COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY percent over three years. Milk quotas would remain In May 1992, after lengthy negotiations and by a unchanged but subject to annual review. Butter supqualified majority, the Council of Agriculture Minport prices would be cut 2.5 percent per year for two isters reached agreement on the reform of the CAP years (1994-95), while prices for skimmed milk based on a compromise put forward by the Portupowder would remain unchanged. Even with these guese Presidency to the EC's (MacSharry's) original price cuts, discrimination against fresh milk prodproposal. The main features of the compromise ucts remains, leading to surplus production of butter agreement are as follows: By 1997, EC price supandmilkpowdersogreatthatinterventionpurchases ports will be cut 29 percent for grains, 15 percent for of dairy products, mainly butter and skim milk powbeef, and 5 percent for butter. The co-responsibility der, exceeded 3. proposal. The main features of the compromise ucts remains,, leading to surplus production of butter···· agreement are as follows: By 1997, EC price supand milk powder so great that intervention purchases···· nnrt~qwillbi-r~iit').(np~rrp,-ntfnrarrqin,, 15nt-.rr~ntfhr nf dnirv nrcuiiit-z mnin·v hiittpr nncl Qkim milk now for 14.2 percent of the EC's budget for surplus support. Essentially, income support must not be production. The total cost of the EC dairy program related to the volume of production, factors of prois in excess of 5 billion ECU per year. duction, domestic or international prices, nor shall In reality the CAP reforms were only minimal production be required to receive such payments. changes in the EC's system of relatively high price
The CAP reform agreement preserves compensatory supports, border protection, and export subsidies.
payments, but they are linked to production. "In Indeed, the principle of EC preference remains inorder to be entitled to compensatory payments, each tact, with the minimum import price for grain, or producer should submit annually an application setthreshold price, fixed at 45 ECU/mt higher than the ting out: (a) surfaces sown with arable crops [and] target price for cereals. The variable levy system (b) surfaces left in set-aside" (Agra Europe, May 22, also remains unchanged. Furthermore, export sub-1992). The set-aside area must equal 15 percent in sidies are still needed to dispose of EC surpluses.
order for farmers to qualify for payments. The EC Compensatory set-asides greater than 15 percent insists that its decoupled compensatory income paywould be needed to bring the EC's surpluses down ments remain in the "green box" and are not subject to the 22 mmt, considered acceptable in Dunkel's to further reductions. GATT proposals (Agra Europe, July 17, 1992).
The new EC oilseeds policy provides a test case of the "adjustments" needed to bridge the gap between the CAP reforms and Dunkel's Compromise pro-COST OF THE REFORMED CAP posal. The new EC oilseeds policy switches support The budgetary costs of the reformed CAP continue away from crushing aids (processor payments to to rise. In nominal terms, estimated CAP price and compensate for high priced EC oilseeds) to direct income support costs will increase from 35 billion income subsidies paid on a yield per-hectare basis. ECU in 1993 to 43.5 billion ECU in 1997 (Figure 3) .
Farmers would receive the market price plus a direct However, EC farm lobbyists have strongly argued subsidy payment. The value of the direct payment, that real farm income will not improve under the which varies inversely with the world price, ensures CAP reforms and they have protested the anticipated farmers that their income will continue to be procuts in farm income (Agra Europe, May 29, 1992) .
tected from world price declines (Agra Europe, Farm lobbies increased the pressure for national January 17, 1992). However, the EC's oilseeds reincome aids to preserve farm income. Indeed, gime is embroiled in a controversy with the U.S. in French farmers have succeeded in securing tax a GATT dispute over the level of support provided breaks, credit concessions, disaster relief, and other to EC farmers. subsidies from their government which the national farmers union considers compensation for the "dam-THE SECTION 301 OILSEEDS CASE age" caused by the CAP reforms (Agra Europe, May
In December 1987, the American Soybean Asso-29, 1992).
ciation filed a Section 301 Petition with the United In summary, the CAP reforms were a minimalist States Trade Representative (USTR) claiming that approach to curtailing rising budgetary costs. While the EC's oilseeds subsidies violated its GATT obliprice supports were cut and supply control measures gations. In December 1989, a GATT panel found that were instituted, only minimal changes were made in the EC's oilseeds subsidies were inconsistent with the dairy program. The reforms preserve the comthe GATT, because the subsidies nullified and implexity of the farm policy, and will require substanpaired the EC's zero-duty bindings on oilseeds tial monitoring and verification of new set-asides granted to the U.S. in 1962 (Danforth 1992) . and environmental programs . Even these CAP reIn January 1990, the EC formally accepted the forms, however, may have strengthened the CAP's findings of the first GATT panel and agreed to make position in the multilateral trade negotiations.
the necessary reforms in its oilseeds policies effective with the 1991 crop year. After some delay, the CAP REFORM AND GATT NEGOTIATIONS EC Council of Agriculture Ministers adopted the CAP reform proposals must be considered in the new subsidy plan (payments to producers on a percontext of an EC commitment to reduce agricultural hectare basis rather than the old subsidy payment to protection in the Uruguay Round of MTN. They oilseed crushers). The new oilseed subsidy guaranhave become implicitly linked to GATT Directorteed EC farmers a return of approximately $13 per General Arthur Dunkel's compromise proposal for bushel, or twice the world market price for oilseeds. agriculture (Summary details can be found in Agra
The U.S. Senate became involved in the trade Europe, Jan. 3, 1992). Dunkel's proposal establishes dispute in October 1991 when it voted 97-0 to urge five criteria defining permissible decoupled income the USTR to file a second action under Section 301 168
Billion ECU 50 - regarding the GATT ruling. The second GATT panel on the principle of compensating producers on a addressed the question of whether the new EC oilproduct-specific basis for the reduction of market seeds regime, adopted in October 1991, met the support due to the reciprocal exchange of tariff conrequirements of the first GATT panel decision (Dancessions in the proposed GATT agreement. The forth 1992). In March 1992, the second GATT panel difference between the oilseeds case and other comruled the new oilseeds regime incompatible with the modities is, of course, that zero tariff bindings do not Community's GATT obligations (Agra Europe, exist for other products. Thus, the EC would reject March 20, 1992).
any Uruguay Round agreement which does not acThe Community's offer of compensation under cept the principles of compensatory payments. Article XXVIII of the GATT has been rejected by the U.S. because the offer did not specifically compensate the injured party, soybean farmers, for their AREAS FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN U.S. alleged losses. Under Article 28, signatories are AND EC IN URUGUAY ROUND OF MTN bound either to reform the offending practices or to Several obstacles still exist before an agreement offer compensation; failure to do so allows the damcan be reached between the U.S. and the EC in the aged party to seek retaliation through its own trade Uruguay Round. The primary issues are rebalancing, regulation mechanisms. The U.S. retaliated by pubthe volume of subsidized exports, the acceptance of lishing a provisional list of $2 billion worth of EC the EC's compensatory payments, and the level of products, including wines, cheeses, beers, and other market access in a GATT agreement. Nevertheless, products, targeted for prohibitive tariffs of 100 perthe CAP reform agreement may provide the necescent or more (Agra Europe, June 12, 1992). The EC sary catalyst to a political agreement in the Uruguay has extended the conflict into the GATT negotiations Round. by insisting on a check of the U.S.'s right to take Closely aligned with the Section 301 oilseeds case unilateral retaliatory action against its trading partis the concept of rebalancing. The EC argues that in ners, such as the countervailing duties imposed unexchange for market access concessions on cereals der the 301 oilseeds case (Agra Europe, July 31, under a Uruguay Round agreement, it should be 1992).
allowed to raise protection on non-grain feedstuffs The second GATT Oilseeds Panel Report calls into such as corn gluten feed, maize germ meal, and citrus question the underlying principle of the EC's CAP pulp. The U.S. argues that not only is rebalancing reform of the cereals sector. The reform was based counter to the spirit of the Uruguay Round of MTN 169 but it also negates the zero-tariff binding negotiated "green box" decoupled payments in that they are not in 1962. Rebalancing was explicitly omitted from tied tofuture levels of production. Thus, they are less Dunkel's text but it remains an implicit problem area likely to stimulate production and distort world marthat could be resolved by U.S.-EC bilateral negotiakets than other forms of existing payments. tions outside of the GATT.
The market access issue has been only partially Both the U.S. and the EC have widely used volunaddressed by the CAP reforms. Threshold prices or tary export restraints (VERs) to limit imports of minimum import prices have been cut by almost textiles, steel, automobiles, tapioca, and other goods one-third through 1997, thus making imports that threaten their domestic producers. The bargaincheaper. However, EC preference is still maintained ing power of the respective contracting parties may as discussed previously. The EC argues that miniexplain policy-makers' preference for a VER on U.S. mum access has been achieved via lower minimum exports of corn gluten feed, maize germ meal, and import prices, while other contracting parties like the citrus pulp to the EC as a solution to the EC's demand U.S. have neither offered nor implemented signififor rebalancing protection on imports of non-feed cant market access concessions. The EC has clearly grain substitutes. The U.S. could "voluntarily" strengthened its position in the negotiating process agree to limit exports of byproducts of the wet corn by concluding a "reform" of its domestic agricultural milling and citrus processing, and in return the U.S. policy prior to bargaining over a multilateral agreewould receive a boost in total farm exports (estiment. Flexible policy mechanisms now exist in the mated at $4-5 billion) under tariffication proposals CAP that would allow adjustment to an external of the final GATT agreement. As an example of a GATT agreement without changing the overall pol-VER, the EC Commission has proposed an annual icy framework. This has been a primary objective of tariff-quota duty of 6 percent on corn gluten imports, EC negotiations since the beginning of Uruguay up to 4.5 mmt, equivalent to 95.7 percent of U.S.
Round of MTN. exports to the Community in 1990 (Agra Europe, January 17, 1992). While producers' associations in CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS the U.S. would be expected to oppose any VER that
The CAP reforms have given the EC farm policy limited their commodity-specific market access, the several characteristics similar to those of the U.S. distribution of gains in other areas among several farm program. Both target and intervention prices interest groups could lead to an acceptable comprohave been fixed for three years in advance. Thus, mise.
there is less opportunity for the farm lobby to exert Arthur Dunkel's draft plan for settlement of the pressure on the Council of Ministers during annual Uruguay Round called for a 36 percent cut in EC price fixing. Also, the level of compensatory income export subsidies and a 24 percent reduction in the payments have been fixed for three years. Regulavolume of subsidized exports. While the CAP retions stipulating which crops can be grown on setforms do not specifically contain cuts adequate to aside land are similar to the rules governing the use reach Dunkel's objectives, the mechanisms now exof conservation reserve acres in the 1990 farm bill. ist to reduce both the value and volume of EC subsiSince farmers have considerable discretion over use dized exports. Intervention prices for cereals have of set-aside acreage, the same uncertainty exists been cut through 1997, which reduces the gap besurrounding their production decisions as in the U.S. tween world market prices and EC prices, thus reThe outlook for a final GATT agreement on agriculducing the cost of subsidization. Second, set-asides ture hinges on the direction and extent of reform of will reduce the volume of surplus production. Morethe Common Agricultural Policy and the response of over, the reform agreement specifically provides for the U.S. to the progress, or the lack thereof, of the annual set-aside adjustments. Since Dunkel's draft negotiations on the key issues of export subsidies, plan is only a basis for negotiations, the final cuts in internal support, and market access. subsidized exports can be achieved through the bi-
The political economy models, discussed earlier, lateral bargaining process.
provide a useful framework to analyze the reform The essential role of the EC's compensatory payproposals and their linkage to the multilateral trade ments is an income subsidy to facilitate the orderly negotiations. The most useful components include: adjustment to the EC's new, lower market prices. Do
(1) complexity and reform, and (2) the role of catathe payments meet the criteria for decoupled income lysts in the bargaining process. support exemptions as stipulated in Dunkel's draft plan? Probably not, because they are related to Complexity and Reform. Moyer and Josling specific commodities and a base period of produc-(1990) argue that policy complexity leads to inertia tion. Nevertheless, these payments may approximate and incrementalism in reform proposals. The CAP 170 reform agreement contains only incremental may lead to incremental changes in the portfolio of changes in the support mechanisms, although they PESTs and PERTs that supports agriculture in both appear at first to contain drastic cuts in price, and the EC and the U.S. Despite the pressure to mainhence income support, for EC farmers. MacSharry's tain the welfare-transferring policies in the Commuproposals and the Agriculture Ministers' final agreenity, shifts in Community policies toward structural ment follow a well established scenario for a reguidance and environmental programs (the Guidsponse to a crisis in agriculture generated by ance Section of the EAGGF budget) will require a over-production: cut commodity prices, reduce the different mix of social welfare transferring policies. agricultural resource base, and export the surplus.
The portfolio of PESTs will change as agriculture The reform agreement adds to the complexity of an adjusts to different socio-economic objectives. already intricate CAP policy. The criteria for setThese include extensive agriculture versus intensive aside compensation are complex while there are farming, rural development in less-favored regions, manifold regulations governing set-aside land use.
environmental protection, and recreational land use. The structure of the bargaining process changes Catalysts and the Reform Process. Moyer and slowly. Governments and interest groups operating Josling hypothesize that only a crisis such as the in an arena of constant political technology generally budget crisis of 1988 could stimulate the legislative will not bring about reform. The Uruguay Round of and bureaucratic actors to overcome their basic inerMultilateral Trade Negotiations is such an external tia and resistance to change (p. 18). The 1988budget entity as can provide a catalyst for reform in the crisis was settled by the European Council, the heads agricultural support policies of the European Comof state, rather than by the Agriculture Ministers.
munity. EC farm lobbyists recognize that the CAP The price support crisis of 1991 was settled by reforms have received a certain stimulus from the incremental changes in established policy mecha-GATT negotiations. Certain U.S. commodity groups nisms. The success of the CAP reform agreement have also been threatened by the loss of their border and the EC's GATT position hinges on either broadprotection measures and other PESTs. If the GATT ening the range of participants to include budgetary negotiations are successful, both sides will have to and other actors more representative of the general "pay" a certain cost by giving up some of their community interest or shifting the locus of decisionPESTs in exchange for other gains in agriculture and making upward to the top political levels.
in other areas. Certainly, the portfolio of PERTs and The pressures for CAP reform and the implications PESTs will not disappear after the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations for agricultural policies of GATT, but the mixture of policies will change.
